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Abstract 
Although most research on US income inequality trends is based on public-use March CPS data, 
a new wave of research using IRS tax return data reports substantially higher levels of inequality 
and faster growing trends for recent years. We show that these apparently inconsistent estimates 
are largely reconciled when the income distribution and inequality are defined in the same way. 
Using internal CPS data for 1967–2006, we show that estimates of top income shares based on 
internal CPS data for 1967–2006 are similar in many respects to the IRS data-based estimates 
reported by Piketty and Saez (2003). Our results imply that changes in US income inequality 
since 1993 are largely driven by changes in the share of the top 1 percent.  
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Introduction 
 The March Current Population Survey (CPS) public-use files have been the primary data 
source used to study income inequality trends in the USA.1 The consensus finding of research 
based on these data is that, excluding capital gains, household income inequality increased 
substantially in the 1970s and 1980s, and continued to increase but at a much slower pace 
starting in the 1990s (Gottschalk and Danziger 2005, Daly and Valetta 2006, and Burkhauser, 
Feng, and Jenkins 2009).  
The most notable alternative source for studying income inequality trends derives from 
tax return data. In their seminal paper, Piketty and Saez (2003) use data from Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) Statistics of Income tax returns to analyze income inequality trends in the USA. 
Their paper used the methods of Piketty (2003), which considered top income shares in France, 
and was one of the first in a growing literature that has used tax return data to examine income 
inequality trends around the world. See Atkinson (2005) for the UK, Saez and Vaell (2005) for 
Canada, Bach, Corneo and Steiner (2009) for Germany, Dell (2005) for Germany and 
Switzerland, and Atkinson and Leigh (2007) for Australia. Atkinson and Piketty (2007), 
Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (forthcoming), and Leigh (2009) provide comprehensive reviews of 
this literature. 
One of Piketty and Saez’s major contributions derives from being able to observe income 
inequality trends over a much longer period than previous researchers: tax return data are 
available for years well before any survey data on income was collected. However, their findings 
have also sparked debate about inequality trends in recent years. For a flavor of the debate on 
this topic, see the blog postings by leading economists and others on the Economists View 
website (2007). Reynolds (2007) provides an illustration of how the work by Piketty and Saez 
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has altered the popular view of recent trends in income inequality and a critique of their results.  
In contrast to research based on CPS data that finds income inequality slowing in the 
1990s, Piketty and Saez (2003, 2008) find that the share of total income, excluding capital gains, 
held by the very richest groups grew during the 1990s and, with the exception of the period from 
2000–2002, continued to rise rapidly through the beginning of the 21st century as well. When 
including capital gains, they find that top income shares grew even faster.  What explains the 
differences in inequality trends found by researchers using these two types of data?  
One explanation is that there are deficiencies in one or both of these data sets that limit 
researchers’ abilities to observe the true trends in inequality. Critics of using the public-use CPS 
to measure income inequality argue that topcoding, undercoverage, and underreporting of top 
incomes restrict the survey’s ability to observe income changes for those at the top of the 
distribution. See inter alia Levy and Murnane (1992), Slemrod (1996), Burkhauser, Couch, 
Houtenville and Rovba (2003–2004), Piketty and Saez (2006b), and Burkhauser, Feng, and 
Jenkins (2009). Thus, to the extent that income inequality changes are due to changes in the 
topcoded portion of the CPS, researchers using this data may mismeasure trends in income 
inequality.  Furthermore, to the extent that income inequality changes are due to income sources 
not captured in the March CPS, such as capital gains, the CPS will also mismeasure income 
inequality trends  
Using IRS data to measure income inequality also has potential limitations, however. 
Critics point out that tax filers have a financial incentive to report their income in ways that limit 
their tax liabilities and, as a result, filing behavior is sensitive to changes in the personal income 
tax rate. There are several fiscal manipulation strategies that are sensitive to changes in marginal 
tax rates and income reporting rules. These include reclassifying income as either wage earnings  
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or business profits depending on which is taxed less (Sivadasan and Slemrod 2008), receiving 
untaxed fringe benefits in lieu of wage compensation (Woodbury and Hammermesh 1992), or 
deferring compensation through stock options or deferred compensation packages (Scholes and 
Wolfson 1992, Goolsbee 2000). Since high income earners are most able to adjust the way that 
they receive and report income, tax return data may especially not be able to capture income at 
the top of the distribution accurately. For example, Slemrod (1995) suggests that tax law changes 
since the 1970s have provided incentives for the very rich to switch their reported income from 
Subchapter-C corporation profits, which are not reported on personal income tax forms, to S-
corporation profits and personal wage income, which are reported. This, in turn, may lead 
researchers using tax return data to overstate the actual rise in income among the very rich. See 
Feenberg and Poterba (1993) for an earlier discussion of this problem and a summary of the 
difficulties measuring top incomes with tax records data. 
Piketty and Saez (2003) acknowledge that this type of fiscal manipulation may affect 
measures of top income shares, but argue that such effects are problematic only for short-term 
trends rather than the long run trends in income inequality which are their primary concern. 
However, for researchers interested in the relatively short-term trends in income inequality of 
recent years, time-shifting of income may still pose a problem. Additionally, while time-shifting 
of income may only impact income inequality in the short-term, income that is received in ways 
other than through labor earnings – such as through higher non-taxable fringe benefits or the 
reporting of wage earnings as business profits – will never be reported on personal income tax 
forms and thus could have implications for long-term inequality trends. Thus, to the extent that 
changes in reporting rules alter the way income is reported at the top of the distribution, 
researchers using IRS tax return data may mismeasure actual changes in income inequality. 
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Yet another potential explanation for the differences in estimated inequality trends is that 
they result from differences in the definition of income and how its distribution is summarized 
rather than differences in the data sources themselves. Although all researchers using public-use 
CPS data or IRS tax data examine “inequality” in the broad sense, there are substantial 
differences in their definitions of “income” (the sources included – most especially the inclusion 
of government transfers and non-taxable income in the former and its exclusion in the latter – 
and whether there is adjustment for differences in “needs”), the income recipient unit (tax units 
versus households and individuals within them), and how best to measure inequality (in terms of 
top income shares versus a more comprehensive measure such as the Gini coefficient).  
To some extent, these differences in practice have evolved because of the nature of the 
data examined. For example, researchers using public-use CPS data, which has a high prevalence 
of topcoded values at the top of the income distribution, often measure inequality using the ratio 
of the 90th percentile to the 10th percentile (“p90/p10”) to mitigate problems arising from 
topcoding. (See Burkhauser, Feng, and Jenkins 2009 for a discussion of the limitations of this 
measure, with CPS illustrations.) Researchers using tax return data focus on top income shares 
since many low income individuals do not file a tax return. So it is not possible to directly derive 
measures of income inequality that directly take account of the income of poorer groups (Piketty 
and Saez 2006a). To date, no researchers have attempted to bridge the gap between the CPS- and 
IRS-based literatures to determine the extent to which the differences in inequality estimates 
emanating from these two literatures arise from differences in the ability of these two data 
sources to capture top incomes or from the application of different income constructs based on 
these data sources. In this paper, we do just that.  
Using internal CPS data, we examine income inequality trends since 1967, excluding 
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capital gains, using the inequality measures and income distribution definitions developed by 
Piketty and Saez (2003) and others using tax return data. Doing so, we can largely match their 
results. Our estimates of top income share levels and trends are nearly identical for groups in the 
richest tenth with the exception of the richest 1 percent. Even for estimates of the share held by 
the top 1 percent, the two data sources are broadly in agreement about trends over much of the 
past 40 years. It is only during a six year period in the late 1990s that the trends diverge for 
reasons that are not easily explained by changes in the nature of the two data sources.  
Data 
Our analysis derives from access to internal CPS data which are identical to the data used 
by Census Bureau researchers in their official work (see e.g. U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). These 
data measure top incomes much better than the data released in public-use CPS files. To protect 
the confidentiality of its respondents, the Census Bureau censors (“top codes”) each of the 
income sources received by individuals. This practice must be addressed in order to derive 
sensible estimates of top income shares using CPS data. The advantage of internal data over 
public-use data is that the prevalence of topcoding is very much lower.2 For example, in 2004, 
0.5 percent of individuals lived in a household in which some source of income was topcoded in 
the internal data compared to 4.6 percent in the public-use data.  
Even the small extent of censoring in the internal CPS data produces biased estimates of 
top income shares. To address this issue, we use a multiple imputation approach in which values 
for censored observations in the internal data are multiply imputed using draws from a 
parametric model of the income distribution fitted to the internal data. The Generalized Beta of 
the Second Kind (GB2) model used here is widely used in the income distribution literature, and 
shown to fit income distributions extremely well across different periods and countries: see e.g. 
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Bordley, McDonald and Mantrala (1996), Brachmann, Stich and Trede (1996), Bandourian, 
McDonald, and Turley (2003), Feng, Burkhauser, and Butler (2006), and Jenkins (2009). Since 
the GB2 is a four-parameter distribution, its shape is more flexible than that of the Pareto 
distribution which has also widely been used in the literature to describe the top of the income 
distribution.  
The multiple imputation approach used here is the same as that used by Burkhauser et al. 
(forthcoming) and described in detail by Jenkins et al. (forthcoming). This approach first 
involves fitting a Generalized Beta of the Second Kind (GB2) distribution for each year’s data by 
maximum likelihood, accounting for individual-level right-censoring.3 We then randomly draw 
values from the income distribution that is implied by the fitted GB2 distribution and impute 
these to censored observations, estimate inequality indices using the distribution comprising 
imputations for censored observations and observed incomes for non-censored observations, and 
repeat the whole process one hundred times for each year. Estimates of inequality indices such as 
top income shares are derived by combining the estimates from each of the one hundred data sets 
for each year using the ‘averaging’ rules proposed by Rubin (1987), and modified by Reiter 
(2003), to account for imputation variability. This combination of Internal CPS data with 
multiply imputed values for censored incomes provides the best available CPS-based estimates 
of the income distribution. It is the source for all the CPS-based estimates of top income shares 
that we compare with the tax record-based estimates of top income shares of Piketty and Saez 
(2003).  
We believe that the flexibility of the GB2 distribution allows for a better fit of top 
incomes than the Pareto distribution but acknowledge that both distributions are widely used to 
impute top incomes in the inequality literature. Fichtenbaum and Shahidi (1988), Bishop, Chiou, 
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and Formby (1994), and Piketty and Saez (2003), for example, use the Pareto distribution. Thus, 
in Appendix A, we explore the implications of using a Pareto imputation instead. We compare 
the Pareto β coefficients describing the shape of the right-tail of the distribution that are implied 
by our CPS data with those that we calculate from the data appendix of Piketty and Saez (2007). 
In general, the β coefficients from our multiply-imputed distributions are slightly smaller than 
those derived from Piketty and Saez’s data. This indicates that, if we had assumed that a Pareto 
distribution with the Piketty-Saez β coefficients described top incomes in the CPS data, the top 1 
percent income share would be larger and even closer to their IRS-based results. 
We have also undertaken all our calculations of top income shares using CPS internal 
data used “as is”, without imputations for censored values. All the conclusions regarding income 
shares for income groups below the top 1 percent are unchanged. For the top 1 percent, using the 
unaltered internal data rather than multiply imputed internal data reduces estimates of income 
shares, but our conclusions about trends are similar. See Appendix A for further details. 
Methods: Three Definitions of the Income Distribution  
There are three substantial methodological differences between research based on the 
CPS and research based on the IRS tax return data. The first concerns the inequality measures 
used. Most CPS research employs either indices such as the Gini coefficient or Theil index that 
use data on all incomes, or indices like p90/p10 that ignore incomes at the very top of the income 
distribution. In contrast, tax data researchers focus on the top of the income distribution, defining 
inequality in terms of top income shares – the share of total income held by the richest 10 
percent, the richest 5 percent, or the richest 1 percent, and so on – with larger income shares 
indicating greater inequality.  
The other two differences in method concern the definitions of income, specifically: what 
8 
 
is counted as “income” and what is the income-receiving unit. CPS-based researchers have 
typically defined income as pre-tax post-transfer income excluding capital gains: see e.g. 
Gottschalk and Danziger (2005) and Burkhauser et al. (forthcoming).4 This includes all income 
collected on the March CPS questionnaire, which is intended to capture almost all cash income 
received by individuals. Two notable exceptions are realized capital gains and profit sharing 
income, including stock options, which are not captured in the CPS. (See Weinberg 2006 for a 
description of income sources collected and excluded in the March CPS data.) This income is 
aggregated to the household level, and deflated using an equivalence scale to account for 
differences in economies of scale and “needs” (the square root of household size is a commonly-
used scale). Attributing the same size-adjusted household income to each individual within the 
same household, researchers examine the distribution of income among individuals. 
Piketty and Saez (2003) and other researchers using tax data use different definitions. 
Piketty and Saez define income to include any income reported on IRS personal income tax 
returns before deductions and excluding capital gains. This encompasses “salaries and wages, 
small business and farm income, partnerships and fiduciary income, dividends, interest, rents, 
royalties, and other small income reported as income” (Piketty and Saez 2003, pp. 5–6). In 
addition to including stock options, which are not included in the CPS survey, a notable 
difference between this income definition and the CPS one is that the IRS definition excludes 
most transfer income, which is generally not taxable and not included in the adjusted gross 
income reported on tax returns. Hence it is close to the individual’s market income, which is also 
known as pre-tax pre-transfer income in the broader income inequality literature.5  See Scholz 
and Levine (2002), Corneo and Fong (2008), and Bach, Corneo, and Steiner (2009) for examples 
of this type of measure. 
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Piketty and Saez (2003) aggregate income to the level of the tax unit rather than to the 
level of the household, do not adjust for differences in tax unit size, and examine the distribution 
among tax units rather than among individuals. An important issue in this literature is that not all 
individuals in the USA file a tax return, with non-filers generally having lower incomes. 
Therefore, estimates of the income share of the top 10 percent of tax filers understate the number 
of tax filers relative to the situation in which non-tax filers are included in the base. That is, when 
the number of “potential tax filing units” (filers plus non-filers) is the base, a higher share of 
actual tax filers and hence a larger share of reported pre-tax pre-transfer income must be 
included in order to correctly measure overall income inequality. To address this issue, Piketty 
and Saez (2003) estimate the total number of potential tax units and calculate the number of 
returns that make up the top income groups using this number. They define a potential tax unit as 
a married couple of any age, divorced or widowed individual of any age, or single individual 
over the age of 20. See the Data Appendix of Piketty and Saez (2007) for further details. 
Definitions of income and the unit of analysis are important because variations in each 
can be expected to lead to different inequality estimates. For example, we expect the inclusion of 
transfer income in income (as is done by CPS researchers) to reduce measured inequality 
because transfer income is targeted at poorer families while the inclusion of stock options in the 
IRS data likely increases inequality.  
Additionally, low income individuals who need to share costs and lower living expenses 
are more likely to live in larger households with individuals outside of their tax unit. Therefore, 
aggregating income to the household level rather than the tax unit, and adjusting for economies 
of scale using an equivalence scale, may yield an inequality estimate that is lower than for the 
distribution of pre-tax pre-transfer income among tax units. 
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The two types of CPS series that we use are defined as follows. First, our “traditional” 
CPS series, labeled “CPS-Post-HH”, refers to the estimates based on the distribution of size-
adjusted pre-tax post-cash transfer household income among individuals, excluding capital gains. 
Size adjustment uses the square root of household size. 
The second CPS-based series, “CPS-Pre-TU”, uses Piketty-Saez-type definitions of the 
income distribution. That is, we consider distributions of non-size-adjusted pre-tax pre-transfer 
tax unit income, excluding capital gains among tax units. Since tax unit identifiers are not 
provided in the CPS, we follow Piketty and Saez’s procedures to determine potential tax units. 
All single individuals over the age of 20, married couples, and divorced or widowed individuals 
are considered to head a tax unit. Never-married children under the age of 20 are considered 
dependents and are assigned to the tax unit of their parent or guardian.6 Our measure of pre-tax 
pre-transfer income includes income from wages and salaries, self-employment, farm income, 
interest, dividends, rents, trusts, and retirement pension income – which closely matches the 
taxable income sources included in the IRS tax return data analyzed by Piketty and Saez.  
Although a small number of taxable transfers are excluded by this definition, the broad income 
categories used by the CPS prior to 1987 make it difficult to separate these taxable transfers from 
non-taxable transfers consistently across the entire period. The vast majority of transfer income 
is non-taxable, and so our best approximation to Piketty and Saez’s income definition necessarily 
excludes this income source. 
Matching the procedures used for Piketty and Saez’s primary income series, capital gains 
are excluded. This exclusion is both because capital gains are not recorded in the March CPS and 
because “[r]ealized capital gains are not an annual flow of income (in general, capital gains are 
realized by individuals in a lumpy way) and form a very volatile component of income with large 
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aggregate variations from year to year depending on stock price variations.” (Piketty and Saez 
2003, p 6). However, as illustrated in the appendix of Piketty and Saez (2003), since capital gains 
are primarily received by high earners and this receipt has increased over time, including capital 
gains would likely raise the level of inequality and its increases in recent years. This would be 
true both using IRS-based data, where capital gains are included by some researchers, and using 
the CPS-based data, where capital gains are generally not included since they would have to be 
imputed as an addition to income recorded on the questionnaire. 
Comparisons between the CPS-Post-HH and CPS-Pre-TU series are informative about 
how much of the difference in top share estimates can be attributed to differences in definitions, 
whereas comparisons between the CPS-Pre-TU series and the “Piketty-Saez” estimates reported 
by Piketty and Saez (2003, 2008) are informative about how much of the difference in estimates 
can be attributed to differences in the underlying data source. 
In order to contrast the three series at several points in the income distribution, we 
examine income shares for three groups within the richest tenth of the distribution each year. We 
consider the fortunes of those with incomes between the 90th and 95th percentiles of the 
distribution (the “p90–p95 group”), those with incomes between the 95th and 99th
 
percentiles of 
the distribution (the “p95–p99 group”), and those in top 1 percent.  
Top Income Shares: IRS- and CPS-based Series Compared 
P90-P95 and P95-P99 income shares: In Figures 1 and 2 we provide our estimates of top 
income shares for the first two of the top income series defined earlier. The income shares for the 
p90–p95 group are presented in Figure 1 and the shares for the p95–p99
 
group are presented in 
Figure 2. For both groups, the estimates of income shares according to the CPS-Post-HH series 
are smaller than the corresponding ones from the Piketty-Saez series. This is unsurprising given 
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the two very different income definitions used. Because a much greater share of non-taxable 
government in-cash transfers –Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Social Security benefits, etc. – are held by the poorest 
90 percent of the pre-tax post-transfer (CPS-Post-HH definition) distribution, we would expect 
the income share of the top 10 percent of the pre-tax post-transfer income distribution to be 
smaller than the income share for the top 10 percent of the Piketty-Saez gross income 
distribution in all years. This is the case.  
But, once we control for differences in definitions, the differences in estimates of income 
share held by these high income groups based on CPS and IRS data are much smaller in both 
level and trend. This can be seen by comparing corresponding estimates in the CPS-Pre-TU and 
Piketty-Saez series. For the p90–p95 group (Figure 1), the CPS-Pre-TU series and Piketty-Saez 
share estimates are almost identical in the beginning of the period. The increase in the CPS-Pre-
TU series p90–p95 group’s income share over the 40 year period is somewhat greater than the 
Piketty-Saez estimates: a rise from 10.9 percent to 12.5 percent, compared to a rise from 11.0 
percent to 11.9 percent. But, even with the slight trend differences, the income shares in each 
year are always close to each other. For the p95–p99 group (Figure 2), levels and trends using 
the CPS-Pre-TU and Piketty-Saez series are even closer, although the CPS-Pre-TU series again 
shows a slightly greater upward trend than the IRS data.  
In addition to comparing the income share of the p90–p95 and p95–p99 groups, we also 
considered the sources from which individuals in these groups received their income. However, 
the GB2-based multiple imputation procedure must be performed on total household income and 
thus cannot distinguish source-level incomes for this analysis. While this limits the usefulness of 
a comparison for the top 1 percent of the distribution, since most individuals in the p90–p95 and 
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p95–p99 groups do not have censored incomes we can use the unadjusted internal data to 
compare the sources of income for members of these groups.7 As discussed in Appendix B, for 
the p90–p95 and p95–p99 income groups, the sources of income for members of these groups are 
also similar between the CPS Pre-TU series and the Piketty-Saez series. This further supports the 
assertion that up through the 99th percentile of the income distribution, the IRS and CPS based 
results are similar once controlling for the differences in income and sharing unit definitions. 
Top 1% income shares: Thus far, we have restricted our attention to groups with incomes 
lying between the 90th and the 99th percentiles. The similarities between the income shares in the 
IRS and CPS data for individuals in this range should be of comfort to both IRS and CPS 
researchers. The similarities mean that, up to the very highest incomes, the two datasets are 
consistent once there is reconciliation of the definitional differences described above. But what 
about the income shares of the top 1 percent?  
It is only within this group that we see larger differences in results across the datasets. 
Figure 3 shows that the income shares for the top 1% of the distribution using each of our three 
series. In contrast to the earlier findings for the other two income groups, when using the same 
pre-tax pre-transfer income definition, a more sizeable unexplained gap remains between the 
datasets. It is worth emphasizing, however, that while the remaining difference is greater than for 
the other two income groups analyzed, the differences in absolute terms between the CPS Pre-
TU series and the IRS series are relatively small, at least in earlier years. Before 1986 the income 
share for the top 1 percent is between 1 and 2 percentage points greater for the Piketty-Saez 
estimates relative to the CPS-Pre-TU series, although this difference expands in later years.  
Trends in income shares: Arguably, inequality trends over time are of greater interest to 
researchers than inequality levels. In both the CPS Pre-TU series and the Piketty-Saez series we 
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find slower growth in the share of income held by the p90–p95 and p95–p99 groups starting in 
the early 1990s than was the case in the 1980s. Thus, both the CPS and IRS data sources suggest 
that whatever top income concentration occurred during the 1990s, it was largely confined to 
increases in the share of income held by the top 1 percent.  
So, what precisely has been happening to the top 1 percent’s share? Prior to 1986, the 
trends in the income share for this group are remarkably similar according to all three series. 
Table 1 shows the average annual percent increases in the top 1 percent’s income share for seven 
sub-periods. The two pre-1986 periods are the relatively low inequality growth period of the 
1970s and the higher inequality growth period from 1980–1986. Each of the three series shows 
similarly small inequality growth in the 1970s, and the 1980–1986 period is even more similar as 
the Piketty-Saez series and two CPS series show almost identical average growth in the share 
held by the top 1 percent. It is only after 1986 that more substantial differences between the 
series begin to appear. The first of these differences occurs from 1986–1988, when the Piketty-
Saez series shows a dramatic 22.1 percent annual increase in the top 1 percent income share. The 
increase according to the CPS-Pre-TU series is a more moderate 2.0 percent.  
This divergence between series subsides in the period immediately after 1988. When the 
CPS-Pre-TU series is used, the difference in the top 1 percent’s income share between this series 
and the Piketty-Saez one is just 0.2 percent per year from 1988 to 1992. Thus, when using 
similar income definitions, the trends in the income share of the top 1 percent are similar in both 
data sources for the entire period between 1967 and 1992 with the exception of 1986–1988. 
From 1992–1993, the trends diverge again across series. In this year, both CPS series 
increase by over 40 percent while the IRS series falls by 4.9 percent. It is only from 1993–2000 
that the IRS series shows a sustained increase in the share of income held by the top 1 percent 
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relative to CPS-Pre-TU series. Over this period, the Piketty-Saez series estimates that the top 1 
percent’s share was rising at an accelerated pace. The 4.1 percent annual increase is more than 
twice the rate of increase in the early 1980s. By contrast, the CPS-Pre-TU series yields an annual 
increase of only 1.5 percent in the income share of the top 1 percent – which is a slower rate of 
increase than seen in the 1980s. But after the divergence for the 1990s, trends across series 
converged again from 2000–2006 and all three series show similar increases of between 1.3 and 
1.5 percent average annual increases in the top 1 percent’s income share.  
So, for most periods during the past 40 years, the trends in top income shares are similar 
– once similar income definitions are used. There are no major differences in the trends implied 
by the different sources for the income shares of those with incomes between the 90th and 99th 
percentiles. It is only during the periods 1986–1988, 1992–1993, and 1993–2000, that the two 
sources show markedly different trends and only then for the top 1 percent of the population. 
Explaining the differences in trends in the share of the top 1 percent 
While the p90-p95 and p95-p99 series are quite close across the two datasets, what 
explains the divergences between series in estimates of the share of the top 1 percent for the 
periods 1986–1988, 1992–1993, and 1993–2000? We argue that the results for the first two 
periods arise from well-known limitations of the IRS tax return data and of the CPS, respectively. 
For 1986–1988, we argue that the increased share of the top 1 percent shown by the 
Piketty-Saez series primarily reflects a change in tax policy rather than any genuine change in 
the incomes controlled by the richest 1 percent. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 provided 
substantial incentives for the very richest tax units to switch reported income from Subchapter-C 
corporations to Subchapter-S income and wage income. (See e.g. Feenberg and Poterba 1993, 
Slemrod 1996, Saez 2004, and Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez, forthcoming.) The tax law changes 
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likely created a behavioral effect in how income is reported, which led to the very large observed 
increase in top income shares in IRS personal tax return data excluding capital gains over the 
course of these two years.   
This blip therefore primarily reflects the IRS tax records improved ability to capture more 
of the income of this top income group after the 1986 Tax Reform Act. The high incomes 
observed after the reform were likely received by individuals at the top of the income 
distribution prior to the reform as well, but since personal income tax rates exceeded corporate 
tax rates individuals had a financial incentive to structure their income in ways that prevented it 
from appearing on personal income tax forms, or only appearing on personal income tax forms in 
the form of capital gains.8   
In contrast, the CPS data shows no such increase between 1986 and 1988 after the Tax 
Reform Act. We suggest that this is because the CPS survey questions about income are broader 
than the detailed questions on IRS tax forms. As a result, nuances such as Subchapter-C versus 
Subchapter-S income that are important for taxpayers completing their tax return, and hence for 
the administrative records derived from them, do not have the same impact on CPS pre-tax 
income reporting. Since the CPS inquires simply about pre-tax income rather than making 
distinctions about whether the income is from a Subchapter-C or Subchapter-S corporation, the 
consequences of this type of reporting are of less personal consequence. Therefore, March CPS 
data are less sensitive than tax record data are to changes in the way in which people distinguish 
between different types of income in response to changes in tax laws.  
Similarly, the divergence between the series for 1992–1993 reflects fundamental changes 
in the design of the CPS rather than a real change in income inequality. Over these years, the 
Census Bureau implemented a major redesign of the survey instrument, including a change to 
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computerized rather than paper-based data collection methods. (See Ryscavage 1995 and Jones 
and Weinberg 2000 for details.) These changes, which also included allowing respondents to 
enter higher income values than allowed previously, improved the ability of the CPS to record all 
incomes but especially top incomes. We argue that this change in measurement primarily 
explains the increase of more than 40 percent in the top 1 percent’s share in the CPS data during 
these years.  
In both the case of the 1986-1988 increase in the IRS tax records and the 1992-1993 
increase in the CPS data, the income shares after the blip should more accurately represent actual 
income at the top of the distribution. With the CPS data this is because the survey was 
redesigned with the intention of improving its capability to capture top incomes and with the IRS 
data this is because top earners are now reporting more of their income in ways that are captured 
on personal income tax records.  
Since the 1992–1993 increase in top income shares in the CPS data primarily reflects a 
change in survey design and the 1986–88 increase in top income shares in the IRS tax records 
data primarily reflects a change in the way that tax units report their income, we explore the 
consequences of controlling for these artifacts of measurement. Figure 4 illustrates the level of 
top 1% income shares in each series over the past 40 years, upwardly adjusting the top income 
shares prior to the blips as if the better information on top incomes now observed were available 
prior to 1986 in the IRS data and prior to 1992 in the CPS data.9 When this is done, the levels of 
the top 1 percent’s share remain within 2.2 percentage points of each other across the two 
datasets until 1994 and the trends are quite similar other than the previously mentioned 
divergence from 1993–2000.  
What explains the divergences for 1993–2000? Several factors could distort top income 
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share trends in both series. For example, including capital gains would likely increase top income 
shares in both series. Conversely, including non-cash benefits (e.g. health insurance, food stamps, 
rent subsidies, etc.), housing stock appreciation, or measuring post-tax income would likely 
decrease top income shares in both series. However, since these factors are excluded from both 
datasets they will distort top income shares equally in both. Thus, the divergence must result 
from income sources that are excluded in one dataset but included in the other and which 
changed during the mid-1990s to influence the trends. Alternatively, the divergence could result 
from a shift in the ability of one or both datasets to capture top incomes over this period. 
One potential explanation, as Reynolds (2006) suggests, is that changes in tax rules, 
requiring executive stock options to be reported as taxable income, led to the estimated rise in 
income share of the top 1 percent in the Piketty-Saez personal income tax series. According to 
this hypothesis, this group’s income share has always been higher than observed (implying a 
greater difference between the Piketty-Saez and CPS-Pre-TU series). And importantly, trends 
according to the two series are more similar on the grounds that the more rapid increase in the 
Piketty-Saez series in the 1990s was an artifact of the changes in tax accounting rules. 
Alternatively, it is possible that the use of stock-options increased in the 1990s and that the IRS 
data accurately captured this increase but the CPS data did not since it does not ask about stock 
options. Thus, this hypothesis would suggest that the top income shares actually were increasing 
in the 1990s but the CPS data simply is unable to observe this change. 
Another possible explanation is that a greater increase in the use of tax-deferred savings 
accounts (401k plans, Keogh plans and IRA tax shelters) by individual in top income groups 
outside the top 1 percent may explain part of the rise in the income share of the top 1 percent in 
the Piketty-Saez series for the late 1990s. Wolff (1998) finds that pension assets are much more 
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important to individuals outside of the top 1 percent of the wealth distribution. However, 
Porterba, Venti, and Wise (2001) show that the ratio of all pensions including defined benefit 
and defined contributions to payroll was steady through at least 1999. Thus, if this explanation 
explains the discrepancy it is possible that it is because income previously received as defined 
benefits, which are missed by both the IRS and CPS data prior to retirement, is now received as 
defined contribution income, which is missed only by the IRS data. As a result, the CPS data 
could artificially observe slower inequality growth as individuals shift from unobserved to 
observed pension income. The IRS data, in contrast, would overstate the levels of top income 
shares by excluding this source of income primarily received lower in the distribution, but would 
be accurate in the trends. 
Each of these explanations for the diverging trends is plausible but difficult to investigate 
further with either data set. The view that the CPS did an increasingly poorer job of capturing top 
incomes in the late 1990s is also plausible. But, if this is the explanation, the timing of the 
differences is curious. After its redesign in 1993, the CPS was better able to capture top incomes, 
as evidenced by the artificial jump in inequality in both of our CPS series between 1992 and 
1993. Moreover, the prevalence of censoring during this period – after the internal data’s 
topcodes were increased – was lower than it was in the mid-1980s or in the early 21st century.10 
So the CPS design changes should have increased the survey’s ability to accurately observe top 
incomes during this period.  
How might future research proceed to investigate these divergences further? Since the 
two datasets are remarkably similar below the 99th percentile and only diverge in the 1990s for 
the top 1 percent, researchers particularly concerned with this additional reconciliation of the 
datasets for the late 1990s should focus on elements of one or both datasets that effect trends 
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differently during this period alone.  
For researchers particularly interested in the top 1 percent income share in the late 1990s, 
the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) may be a fruitful source for comparisons. Wolff and 
Zacharias (2009) compare SCF estimates of top income shares to those of Piketty and Saez and 
find similar levels for the top 1 percent’s share in recent years – although they observe more of 
the rise coming prior to 1994 than Piketty and Saez do. Kennickell (2009) compares SCF 
estimates to Piketty and Saez’s estimates for income including capital gains and finds a top 1 
percent income share in 2006 that is less than 1 percentage point below that reported by Piketty 
and Saez, along with similar, but slightly smaller, trends in the top 1 percent income share since 
1994. Because the SCF produces top income share estimates that are in line with those from the 
CPS and IRS data, researchers interested in more fully understanding the 1993–2000 discrepancy 
between the datasets may be able to gain insight into the precise causes through a careful 
analysis that includes all three of these datasets. 
Income inequality trends according to Gini coefficients  
Thus far we have explored the ability of CPS data to capture trends in the share of pre-tax 
pre-transfer income going to top tax units in the IRS tax record data as measured by Piketty and 
Saez. But inequality trends can also be influenced by the choice of inequality index. It is less 
clear though, whether this choice has a practical impact on recent inequality trends in the United 
States. From country-level time series cross-section data, Leigh (2007) concludes that top 
income shares track other inequality measures reasonably well. However, to our knowledge, no 
previous study has performed a comparison of inequality trends using both the Gini coefficient 
and top income shares using a long run of comparable unit record data from the same country.  
Since a top income share is the only inequality measure that can be readily derived from 
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IRS tax record data we focus this analysis on the CPS data. Using the two CPS-based series, we 
compare the observed growth in income inequality using the Gini coefficient to the trend in the 
income share of the top 1 percent and the top 10 percent of the population. By using the same 
sample to compare results for these three inequality measures, we can determine the extent to 
which the choice of inequality measures influences the observed trends in income inequality.  
Table 2 shows the average annual percent increases using these three income inequality 
measures in the CPS data for the seven subperiods since 1967 and for the entire 40 year period, 
suppressing the artificial increase from the 1992-1993 redesign.11 Using either CPS-based 
income series, the two top income share series exhibit faster inequality growth than the Gini 
series when considering the entire 40 year period. When considering the subperiods, the pattern 
is mixed with the top 1 percent’s income share exhibiting higher growth than the Gini coefficient 
in some periods (1980–1988, 1993–2000, and 2000-2006) and slower growth in others (1967-
1980 and 1988–1992). During the period of greatest disagreement between the two literatures – 
from the early 1990s through the 2000s where the IRS-based literature has observed much larger 
increases in income inequality – this difference is quite large. Using the CPS Pre-TU series, the 
growth in inequality as measured by the top 1 percent’s income share grew approximately 1.5 
percent per year from 1993 through 2006. This compares to an average annual growth of just 0.3 
percent per year in the Gini coefficient. (The growth in the top 10 percent’s income share is 
much closer to that of the Gini.) 
These results also help explain why researchers examining top income shares using IRS 
tax records have found continued inequality growth through the 1990s while researchers 
examining Gini coefficients using CPS data have not. We previously observed some differences 
in inequality trends between the two datasets during this period even using the same inequality 
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measure. However, Table 2 shows that differences in the inequality trends observed in these two 
literatures also stem from differences in the inequality index used.  
Since there are discrepancies in the top 1 percent income shares across the two datasets in 
the 1990s, however, this complicates the analysis for researchers who prefer the IRS based top 1 
percent results but also wish to use the Gini coefficient to measure inequality. But since we have 
demonstrated that the IRS and CPS data are consistent up through the 99th percentile, it is 
possible to incorporate one’s preferred top 1 percent series by using the Gini from the bottom 99 
percent of the distribution from the CPS data along with information about the top 1 percent of 
the distribution from IRS data. This type of approach is demonstrated by Atkinson, Piketty, and 
Saez (2009). For researchers interested in combining the datasets in this way, Gini coefficients 
for the bottom 99 percent of the population, along with those for the complete distribution, 
estimated using our CPS-Pre-TU and CPS-Post-HH series are provided in Appendix Table C1. 
Summary and Conclusions 
We analyze trends in top income shares in the USA excluding capital gains over four 
decades (1967–2006), with the goal of reconciling estimates derived from the CPS with those 
reported by Piketty and Saez (2003) and derived from IRS tax return data. Our CPS-based 
estimates draw on the internal data used by the Census Bureau to produce their official income 
statistics, which is a much better source for examining income distribution trends than CPS 
public-use data because the prevalence of topcoding is substantially smaller.  
When applying a Piketty-Saez-type definition of the income distribution to CPS data (the 
CPS-Pre-TU series), we derive estimates of top income shares that are remarkably similar in 
terms of both levels and trends to those reported by Piketty and Saez (2003, 2008) for both the 
p90–p95 and p95–p99 groups. The shares grew in the 1980s and then slowed starting in the early 
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1990s. For the top 1 percent, our CPS-Pre-TU series provides a slightly lower share estimates 
than the Piketty-Saez series does but, with the exception of the period 1993–2000, the trends in 
the series are similar. Thus, we conclude that the differences in inequality trends observed by 
researchers using these two data sources are not primarily due to deficiencies in either data 
source but rather to the traditions of income inequality measurement used in the two literatures. 
To explore this possibility further we also measure income inequality using Gini 
coefficient in the March CPS data, and compare results to those using top income shares. When 
using identical data, source of income, and income receiving units but different inequality 
measures, we found that the growth in the income share of the top 1 percent of the population 
substantially outpaced measured inequality using the Gini coefficient (Table 2). Thus, we 
conclude that at least part of the differing views in the two literatures about recent trends in 
income inequality can be attributed to differences in the literatures’ measures of income 
inequality. Specifically, while the income divergence between the very top income holders and 
the rest of society was growing in the 1990s, the growth in income inequality across the entire 
distribution occurred at a more moderate pace.  
When we use the same measure of income inequality – the income share of the top 1 
percent – and similar income definitions – pre-transfer, tax-unit income excluding capital gains – 
with the CPS data we are, for the most part, able to reproduce the same levels and trends Piketty 
and Saez find using the IRS tax record data. The only divergence in observed income inequality 
unexplained by a known deficiency in either or both datasets occurs over the period 1993–2000. 
It is possible that in this period of rapid economic growth, the CPS was unable to capture the rise 
in pre-tax pre-transfer income of the very richest people or that one or both datasets were limited 
in their analysis of income trends due to income that is outside the scope of their collection 
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procedures. But, despite this limitation, users of both CPS and of IRS tax return data should be 
comforted by our finding that, for most groups at the top and for most of the past four decades, 
the differences in estimates from the two data sources are minor. 
Given that we find that CPS top income trends have been broadly consistent with IRS 
trends, and given that the CPS data includes many socio-demographic variables that are not 
available in tax data, CPS survey data should not be neglected for the study of top incomes.  
Nevertheless, the CPS trends for the top 1% are still below IRS trends – in part because the CPS 
excludes all capital gains and some stock options and bonuses, which are important income 
components for some individuals at the top of the distribution.  Thus, the two datasets may best 
be used jointly with the CPS data providing socio-demographic variables and the IRS data 
providing income variables that cannot be obtained using the CPS.  Ideally, the Census Bureau 
will work jointly with the IRS to match the CPS with IRS administrative records, as this would 
greatly improve the ability of researchers to benefit from the strengths of both datasets.     
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Figure 1: Estimates from CPS and IRS tax return data of the share of total income held by 
units with incomes between the 90th and 95th percentiles, 1967–2006  
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Sources. The Piketty-Saez series is taken from Piketty and Saez (2003, 2008). It refers to the 
distribution of pre-tax pre-transfer income among tax units. The CPS-based series were derived 
by the authors from CPS internal data. The CPS-Pre-TU series was derived using the Piketty-
Saez definition; the CPS-Post-HH series refers to the distribution of size-adjusted pre-tax post-
transfer household income among individuals. See main text for further details. 
Note: Vertical lines delineate time periods displayed in Table 1 and discussed in the main text. 
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Figure 2: Estimates from CPS and IRS tax return data of the share of total income held by 
units with incomes between the 95th and 99th percentiles, 1967–2006 
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Sources and notes: see Figure 1. 
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Figure 3: Estimates from CPS and IRS tax return data of the share of total income held by 
the top 1 percent, 1967–2006 
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Sources and notes: see Figure 1. 
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Figure 4: Estimates from CPS and IRS tax return data of the share of total income held by 
the top 1 percent, 1967–2006, adjusting for measurement changes between 1986–1988 in 
the IRS data and between 1992–1993 in the CPS data. 
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Sources and notes: see Figure 1.  
Note: The Piketty-Saez series is adjusted upward prior to 1988 to reflect the systematic 
undercounting of tax unit income captured in IRS personal income tax records prior to the 1986 
Tax Reform Act. The CPS series is adjusted upward prior to 1993 to reflect the systematic 
undercounting of income from top-income households prior to the 1993 CPS redesign. To 
control for the difference between these measurement changes and actual changes in the blip 
years, it was assumed that the change in top 1% income shares from the unaffected dataset 
reflects the actual change in the top income share over the blip years.  
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Table 1: Average annual percentage change in income share of the top 1 percent, by 
subperiod between 1967 and 2006 
  
 
Subperiod March CPS IRS tax return data 
 
Size-adjusted pre-tax post-
transfer household income 
among individuals 
Pre-tax pre-transfer tax 
unit income  
among tax units 
Pre-tax pre-transfer 
tax unit income 
among tax units 
 
(“CPU-Post-HH”) (“CPU-Pre-TU”) (“Piketty-Saez”) 
1967–1980 –0.5 0.2 –0.2 
1980–1986 1.7 1.9 1.9 
1986–1988 3.2 2.0 22.1 
1988–1992 0.0 0.8 0.6 
1992–1993 45.0 42.5 –4.9 
1993–2000 1.6 1.5 4.1 
2000–2006 1.3 1.4 1.5 
Sources: see Figure 1.  
 
35 
 
 
Table 2: Average annual percentage change in income inequality using three inequality 
measures, by subperiod between 1967 and 2006, adjusting for measurement changes in 
1992–1993 in the CPS data. 
 
 
 Subperiod   CPS Post-HH   CPS Pre-TU 
  Gini 
Share of 
Top 1% 
Share of 
Top 10%  Gini 
Share of 
Top 1% 
Share of 
Top 10% 
1967–1980  0.1 –0.5 –0.2  0.4 0.2 0.5 
1980–1986  1.2 1.7 1.1  0.7 1.9 1.1 
1986–1988  0.6 3.2 0.9  –0.1 2.0 0.5 
1988–1992  0.4 0.0 0.5  0.9 0.8 1.0 
1992–1993a  –0.8 –4.9 –0.8  –0.8 –4.9 –0.8 
1993–2000  0.2 1.6 0.7  0.0 1.5 0.4 
2000–2006  0.6 1.3 0.5  0.5 1.4 0.7 
         
1967–2006b   0.4 0.6 0.4   0.4 1.0 0.7 
 
Sources: see Figure 1. 
a
 Following the procedure in Figure 4, the CPS series is adjusted upward prior to 1993 to reflect 
the systematic undercounting of income from top-income households prior to the 1993 CPS 
redesign. The change between 1992 and 1993 is reported as the corresponding change observed 
by Piketty and Saez (2003) using IRS records. Since the Gini coefficient cannot be calculated in 
the IRS data, the 1992–1993 change assumed for the Gini coefficient matches that in the IRS tax 
return data for the top 10% income share. From other years, this appears to be the closest 
approximation available in the IRS data. 
b
 Following the procedure in Figure 4, the CPS series is adjusted upward prior to 1993 to reflect 
the systematic undercounting of income from top-income households prior to the 1993 CPS 
redesign, thus suppressing the 1992-1993 blip and replacing it with the corresponding change 
observed by Piketty and Saez (2003) using IRS records. 
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Appendix A. Sensitivity analysis: Pareto-based imputation and no imputation (unadjusted 
internal CPS data) 
 
Imputation of some kind is necessary when one wishes to calculate income inequality for 
the entire income distribution including topcoded observations, and imputation has therefore 
been commonly-used in both the CPS-based inequality literature and the IRS-based inequality 
literature. To account for censoring in the internal CPS data (albeit of limited extent), we used 
the multiple imputation (MI) approach described in the main text. To investigate the potential 
sensitivity of our results to this choice, we also considered the implications of, first, using 
imputations based on the assumption that top incomes follow the Pareto distribution and, second, 
using no imputation at all, i.e. using unadjusted internal CPS data. To investigate the Pareto 
approach, we computed the β coefficients implied by our GB2-based multiply-imputed data and 
compared these to the β coefficients from Piketty and Saez’s (2008) results. For any threshold, y, 
the Pareto β coefficient can be calculated as β = y (y)/y, where y (y) is the mean income above 
the income threshold y. If the Pareto distribution correctly describes the distribution above a 
particular threshold y°, then estimates of β should be the same if re-computed using any 
threshold y > y°. For Pareto-based imputation to be robust, we would hope to observe little 
variation in the estimates of β with different top income thresholds. However, the values of β 
derived from both Piketty and Saez’s and our datasets depend on the threshold chosen, and so we 
report values calculated for three thresholds (p90, p95, and p99). We derive them from our 
multiply-imputed CPS data for each year using our CPS Pre-TU income definition and compare 
them with the β coefficients derived from Piketty and Saez’s IRS tax record data using the same 
thresholds. The estimates are plotted in Appendix Figure A1. 
 Using each of the three thresholds, the β coefficients implied from our GB2 estimation 
are somewhat lower than those in the IRS data. Since a higher β coefficient indicates greater 
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concentration in the upper tail of the distribution, had we assumed that top incomes fit a Pareto 
distribution characterized by the parameters implied by the IRS data, the top 1 percent income 
shares would be slightly greater than those shown in the main body of the paper, and would 
likely be even closer to those reported by Piketty and Saez (2003).  
We also undertook all our calculations of top income shares from unadjusted internal 
CPS data used “as is”, i.e. without imputations for censored values. Appendix Figures A2 
through A4 provide the top income shares using the pre-tax, pre-transfer tax-unit income 
definition estimated from both the unadjusted internal CPS data series and from our CPS data 
series which includes GB2-based multiple imputations for topcoded observations. 
 For the p90–p95 income group and the p95–p99 income group, the levels and trends in 
income shares derived from the unadjusted CPS data closely match those from the MI series, and 
both are close to the levels and trends shown by Piketty and Saez (2003) using IRS tax records. 
This is not unexpected as less than 1 percent of individuals lived in a household in which some 
source of income was censored in the internal data: censoring primarily impacts those in the very 
top income group.  
 For the top 1 percent’s income share, using the unadjusted CPS data rather than the MI 
data results in a lower level of measured income inequality and a slightly lower income 
inequality growth. The general patterns of inequality increases are similar, however, with the top 
1 percent’s share increasing at a pace similar to that shown by Piketty and Saez in the 1980s 
(although the unadjusted internal data observes the increase later in the 1980s than the other two 
series). As with the MI series, the rate of increase in the top 1 percent’s share then slows in the 
1990s compared to that reported by Piketty and Saez before showing similar patterns again in the 
early 21st century.  
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Thus, our main findings hold even if no imputations are made for the small number of 
observations censored in the internal CPS data. Controlling for differences in income definitions 
and inequality measures, estimates using CPS and IRS data are consistent for almost all of the 
past 40 years with the exception of the mid- to late-1990s. 
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Appendix Figure A1: Pareto β coefficients derived from GB2-based multiply-imputed CPS 
data and IRS tax data, by top income threshold, 1967–2006 
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Appendix Figure A2: Internal CPS data estimates of the share of total income held by units 
with incomes between the 90th and 95th percentiles, with and without GB2-based multiply-
imputed imputations for censored observations, 1967–2006 
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Sources. The Piketty-Saez series is taken from Piketty and Saez (2003, 2008). It refers to the 
distribution of pre-tax pre-transfer income among tax units. The CPS-based series were derived 
by the authors from CPS internal data. The CPS-Pre-TU series with the GB2 imputation matches 
the CPS-Pre-TU series from the main text, using our GB2 imputation to derive censored incomes 
in the internal data. The CPS-Pre-TU series using unadjusted internal data uses the unadjusted 
internal data “as is”. See Appendix A and the main text for further details. 
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Appendix Figure A3: Internal CPS data estimates of the share of total income held by units 
with incomes between the 95th and 99th percentiles, with and without GB2-based multiply-
imputed imputations for censored observations, 1967–2006 
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Sources: see note to Appendix Figure A1. 
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Appendix Figure A4: Internal CPS data estimates of the share of total income held by the 
top 1 percent of units, with and without GB2-based multiply-imputed imputations for 
censored observations, 1967–2006 
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Sources: see note to Appendix Figure A1. 
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Appendix B. Sources of income: unadjusted internal CPS data versus Piketty-Saez data  
 
Having established that, in general, the share of income in March CPS data going to the 
top 10 percent of the distribution closely matches that found in IRS tax record data by Piketty 
and Saez (2007), we also seek to understand how the sources of income compare for these 
individuals. When doing so, it is necessary to use the unadjusted internal data rather than the data 
based on our GB2-based multiple imputation (MI) procedure. This is because the MI procedure 
is used to impute the total income of right-censored observations and, hence, income sources 
cannot be identified for observations with imputed values. (It is infeasible to impute each income 
source separately and then aggregate across income sources. To do so, the imputation model 
would have to characterize cross-source correlations as well as the marginal distributions – the 
number of which would increase substantially in any case.) 
By using the unadjusted internal CPS data rather than the MI data, we are unable to 
observe the actual incomes, or the sources of those incomes, for observations with censored 
income. But since many individuals in the top 1 percent of the income distribution have topcoded 
data, we are only able to provide meaningful income source information for the p90–p95 and 
p95–p99 income groups where censoring is less prevalent. 
As illustrated in Appendix Table B1, the sources of income are similar for the p90–p95 
income groups in the CPS and IRS data. The percent of income among members of this group 
received from wages ranges from 85.1 to 89.3 percent of income when using the CPS Pre-TU 
data, compared to a range of 86.9 to 91.6 percent of income when using the IRS tax records data. 
While there are some year-to-year fluctuations in the income received from wages, the level is 
remarkably stable in both the IRS and CPS data over the 40 year period.  
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Among the p95–p99 income group, the income shares are also as similar, with the share 
of income received from wages ranging from 74.8 to 85.7 percent of income in the CPS data and 
from 73.3 to 84.4 percent of income in the IRS tax records data (Appendix Table B2). There are 
only 5 years (1983, 1996, 1998, 1999) where the difference in the share of income received from 
wages is greater than 4 percent in the two datasets. Additionally, both datasets show increases in 
the portion of wages from income of approximately 7.5 percent over the 40 year period while the 
income from entrepreneurial activities declined. The only substantial difference between the 
series is that the IRS tax records data indicate that the portion of income from assets declined 
since 1967, whereas the CPS data suggest that asset income increased in importance to these 
high-income individuals. In general, however, not only do the IRS and CPS data closely match 
the share of income received by top earners in the income distribution, but they also provide 
similar results for the sources of that income. 
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Appendix Table B1: Income composition by source for tax-units with incomes between the 
90th and 95th percentiles of the income distribution, 1967–2006 
 
Year CPS Pre-TU (Unadjusted)  
 
Piketty-Saez 
 
Wage Entrepreneurial Asset  
 
Wage  Entrepreneurial Asset 
1967 86.3 10.3 3.3   88.2 7.3 4.6 
1968 87.3 9.5 3.2   88.6 7.0 4.3 
1969 88.8 7.7 3.4   88.6 6.8 4.6 
1970 89.3 7.5 3.2   89.2 6.0 4.7 
1971 88.1 8.8 3.2   90.1 5.6 4.3 
1972 87.9 8.9 3.2   89.6 5.9 4.6 
1973 87.3 9.1 3.6   88.8 6.4 4.9 
1974 86.9 9.2 3.9   86.9 6.6 6.5 
1975 87.5 8.6 3.9   88.7 5.6 5.7 
1976 87.9 7.7 4.3   88.4 5.8 5.8 
1977 88.2 7.7 4.1   88.7 5.4 5.9 
1978 88.7 7.0 4.3   88.4 5.8 5.7 
1979 87.8 7.6 4.6   89.1 5.2 5.7 
1980 89.1 6.0 5.0   88.6 4.5 6.9 
1981 87.3 6.6 6.1   88.1 3.7 8.2 
1982 87.2 6.0 6.8   89.2 2.5 8.3 
1983 85.1 7.5 7.3   89.5 3.4 7.1 
1984 86.2 6.1 7.7   89.9 3.2 6.8 
1985 86.9 5.8 7.4   89.9 3.2 6.8 
1986 86.9 6.4 6.6   90.1 3.8 6.0 
1987 86.5 8.0 5.4   90.1 4.3 5.6 
1988 86.7 6.9 6.4   89.4 4.9 5.8 
1989 85.7 7.8 6.5   88.6 4.9 6.5 
1990 85.7 7.5 6.8   88.7 4.7 6.6 
1991 86.3 7.8 5.9   89.4 4.7 5.9 
1992 87.0 7.4 5.7   90.9 4.3 4.8 
1993 88.2 6.3 5.6   90.9 5.0 4.2 
1994 89.2 5.6 5.2   91.1 5.0 3.9 
1995 88.4 5.6 6.0   91.6 4.5 3.9 
1996 86.4 6.4 7.2   90.8 4.7 4.6 
1997 85.7 6.2 8.2   91.0 4.8 4.2 
1998 86.1 6.1 7.8   91.1 4.9 4.0 
1999 85.4 6.4 8.2   90.6 5.5 3.9 
2000 87.4 5.7 6.9   89.7 5.6 4.7 
2001 87.8 5.8 6.5   91.2 5.0 3.8 
2002 89.2 5.5 5.3   89.9 6.2 4.0 
2003 88.5 5.4 6.0   90.1 6.3 3.6 
2004 88.9 5.3 5.8   89.4 6.8 3.8 
2005 88.5 5.0 6.5   88.1 7.5 4.4 
2006 86.9 6.1 7.1  88.2 6.8 5.1 
 
Sources: The Piketty-Saez series is calculated from Piketty and Saez (2007, 2008). The CPS-Pre-TU 
series using unadjusted internal data uses the unadjusted internal data “as is”. See Appendix A and the 
main text for further details. 
Entrepreneurial income includes self-employment and farm income. Asset income includes interest from 
interest, dividends, and rents. For comparability with the source-decomposition results presented in 
Piketty and Saez (2007), income from other sources are excluded and the sum of incomes from wages, 
entrepreneurial activities, and asset income is scaled to sum to 100 percent. Other forms of income 
represent less than 4 percent of income in all years.
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Appendix Table B2: Income composition by source for tax-units with incomes between the 
95th and 99th percentiles of the income distribution, 1967–2006 
 
Year CPS Pre-TU (Unadjusted) 
  
Piketty-Saez 
 
Wage Entrepreneurial Asset 
  
Wage Entrepreneurial Asset 
1967 74.8 18.8 6.4   73.3 17.4 9.3 
1968 76.8 16.8 6.3   73.7 17.2 9.1 
1969 77.9 15.3 6.8   75.3 16.1 8.6 
1970 78.9 14.7 6.4   77.1 14.1 8.7 
1971 79.1 14.6 6.3   77.6 13.4 9.0 
1972 77.8 16.1 6.1   76.4 14.6 9.0 
1973 75.9 17.3 6.8   74.2 16.0 9.8 
1974 78.1 15.3 6.6   74.3 15.5 10.3 
1975 78.9 14.7 6.4   77.4 13.3 9.3 
1976 79.4 13.7 6.9   77.9 12.7 9.4 
1977 79.0 13.9 7.0   78.1 12.4 9.5 
1978 77.8 15.4 6.8   78.0 12.6 9.4 
1979 78.3 13.1 8.6   78.4 11.5 10.1 
1980 80.6 11.2 8.2   79.7 8.5 11.9 
1981 79.2 11.0 9.8   80.6 6.1 13.2 
1982 79.5 10.6 10.0   81.2 5.4 13.5 
1983 78.9 10.8 10.3   83.4 5.7 10.9 
1984 78.9 10.3 10.8   81.8 6.3 11.9 
1985 81.2 8.7 10.1   82.9 6.6 10.5 
1986 81.1 9.9 9.0   83.3 7.3 9.4 
1987 80.1 10.5 9.4   81.8 8.9 9.3 
1988 80.5 10.6 8.9   80.3 10.4 9.3 
1989 78.1 11.3 10.6   79.3 10.3 10.3 
1990 78.9 10.3 10.8   80.5 9.8 9.7 
1991 79.1 11.0 9.9   80.8 10.2 9.0 
1992 82.3 8.7 9.0   82.6 10.5 6.9 
1993 80.8 10.3 9.0   83.2 10.7 6.1 
1994 81.5 9.4 9.1   82.9 10.8 6.3 
1995 82.8 7.2 10.0   82.9 10.8 6.3 
1996 81.9 7.8 10.3   82.4 11.1 6.5 
1997 78.1 8.7 13.2   82.0 11.0 7.1 
1998 78.7 8.2 13.1   82.2 11.4 6.5 
1999 76.8 10.5 12.7   82.2 11.3 6.5 
2000 81.5 8.9 9.7   82.3 11.0 6.7 
2001 83.5 7.5 9.0   83.2 10.9 5.9 
2002 85.7 7.6 6.7   84.1 10.6 5.3 
2003 84.1 7.8 8.2   84.4 10.6 5.0 
2004 83.5 7.7 8.8   83.2 11.5 5.3 
2005 83.5 7.3 9.3   81.5 12.6 5.9 
2006 82.3 7.4 10.3   80.9 12.2 6.9 
 
Sources: See note to Appendix Table B1. 
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Appendix Table B3: Income composition by source for tax-units with incomes in the top 1 
percent of the income distribution, 1967–2006 
 
Year CPS Pre-TU (Unadjusted) 
  
Piketty-Saez 
 
Wage Entrepreneurial Asset 
  
Wage Entrepreneurial Asset 
1967 55.3 32.6 12.1   41.8 33.1 25.2 
1968 52.4 33.5 14.1   42.0 31.5 26.5 
1969 49.4 34.1 16.5   43.9 31.1 25.0 
1970 56.0 29.6 14.4   45.6 30.0 24.3 
1971 52.6 33.6 13.8   47.6 28.8 23.7 
1972 55.7 30.9 13.4   49.3 27.2 23.5 
1973 56.2 31.4 12.4   49.1 27.2 23.6 
1974 54.4 30.3 15.4   49.4 26.2 24.5 
1975 57.3 29.2 13.5   52.9 23.4 23.7 
1976 57.8 28.2 14.0   54.7 22.0 23.3 
1977 56.4 26.2 17.3   56.1 21.0 22.9 
1978 59.4 27.5 13.2   58.1 19.6 22.3 
1979 61.6 22.6 15.8   59.0 17.0 24.0 
1980 63.8 17.9 18.3   60.5 13.3 26.2 
1981 66.4 17.1 16.6   62.7 7.8 29.5 
1982 65.1 16.9 18.0   62.6 8.2 29.2 
1983 62.8 18.4 18.8   65.5 9.8 24.7 
1984 59.9 15.8 24.3   66.1 9.9 24.0 
1985 68.6 15.0 16.4   63.6 11.0 25.4 
1986 68.1 15.1 16.8   65.7 11.1 23.1 
1987 70.2 14.5 15.3   63.9 17.2 18.9 
1988 69.5 16.2 14.3   59.8 21.2 19.1 
1989 70.4 15.1 14.5   56.7 22.3 21.0 
1990 68.2 15.8 16.0   57.9 22.3 19.8 
1991 69.7 13.9 16.4   57.4 23.0 19.7 
1992 73.0 15.2 11.7   61.6 23.6 14.8 
1993 76.8 14.6 8.6   62.1 23.8 14.1 
1994 81.6 10.9 7.5   59.1 26.8 14.1 
1995 80.2 10.8 9.0   59.2 27.3 13.5 
1996 80.7 11.0 8.3   59.7 27.0 13.3 
1997 77.7 12.6 9.7   60.3 26.7 13.0 
1998 77.3 14.2 8.5   61.1 26.6 12.3 
1999 81.7 8.2 10.1   62.1 26.1 11.8 
2000 82.0 10.6 7.3   63.0 24.7 12.3 
2001 82.9 10.1 7.1   61.7 26.5 11.8 
2002 86.9 8.3 4.8   61.2 27.4 11.4 
2003 83.5 11.0 5.6   60.2 27.7 12.1 
2004 84.7 9.0 6.2   58.4 28.4 13.2 
2005 81.8 12.6 5.7   54.8 30.9 14.4 
2006 82.0 10.8 7.2   53.5 30.1 16.4 
 
Sources: See note to Appendix Table B1. 
Note: Because censoring threshold changes vary by income source, the sources of income in the 
Unadjusted CPS data is particularly sensitive to changes in the topcode thresholds and, unlike 
results in the main text of the paper, these results are not adjusted using the GB2-based multiple 
imputation procedure. Thus, while income composition results are provided for the top 1 percent 
for completeness and as a reference for the reader, we discourage overanalyzing the composition 
of the top 1 percent due to these censoring concerns.  
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Appendix Table C1: Gini coefficients for the entire population and the bottom 99 percent 
of the income distribution using the two CPS-based income definitions, 1967-2006 
 
 
Gini Coefficients 
Entire Population 
 Gini Coefficients 
Excluding the top 1% 
 
CPS Post-HH CPS Pre-TU  CPS Post-HH CPS Pre-TU 
1967 0.365 0.479  0.339 0.457 
1968 0.353 0.474  0.329 0.453 
1969 0.354 0.479  0.330 0.458 
1970 0.358 0.488  0.335 0.468 
1971 0.360 0.496  0.337 0.476 
1972 0.363 0.502  0.340 0.481 
1973 0.361 0.481  0.338 0.463 
1974 0.356 0.492  0.334 0.472 
1975 0.361 0.502  0.338 0.482 
1976 0.361 0.503  0.338 0.482 
1977 0.365 0.505  0.341 0.484 
1978 0.365 0.502  0.342 0.481 
1979 0.369 0.503  0.345 0.481 
1980 0.370 0.506  0.347 0.486 
1981 0.376 0.514  0.354 0.493 
1982 0.388 0.524  0.364 0.503 
1983 0.394 0.526  0.370 0.503 
1984 0.395 0.523  0.369 0.500 
1985 0.391 0.522  0.369 0.502 
1986 0.397 0.526  0.372 0.504 
1987 0.397 0.525  0.372 0.501 
1988 0.401 0.526  0.374 0.501 
1989 0.408 0.533  0.376 0.503 
1990 0.404 0.532  0.375 0.506 
1991 0.402 0.536  0.376 0.513 
1992 0.408 0.544  0.382 0.520 
1993 0.435 0.569  0.392 0.530 
1994 0.434 0.569  0.394 0.532 
1995 0.431 0.565  0.389 0.526 
1996 0.436 0.568  0.391 0.527 
1997 0.440 0.569  0.394 0.527 
1998 0.439 0.566  0.393 0.523 
1999 0.438 0.565  0.395 0.526 
2000 0.443 0.570  0.393 0.524 
2001 0.448 0.578  0.396 0.532 
2002 0.440 0.576  0.396 0.536 
2003 0.442 0.576  0.400 0.540 
2004 0.445 0.581  0.400 0.541 
2005 0.452 0.583  0.404 0.541 
2006 0.457 0.588  0.404 0.540 
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations using Internal March CPS data 
Note: No adjustment is made for the blip in the CPS data between 1992 and 1993.  A 
corresponding series adjusting for the 1992-1993 blip using the methods described in the main 
text of the paper is available upon request from the authors.   
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 See Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995), Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) and 
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) for reviews of the income distribution literature. For more 
recent examples of the use of the public-use CPS in measuring inequality trends in the USA, see 
Gottschalk and Danziger (2005), and Burkhauser, Feng and Jenkins (2009). 
2
 For many indices of income inequality such as the Gini coefficient and members of the General 
Entropy class, researchers can replicate results derived from internal CPS data by using cell-
means of topcoded incomes that are provided back to 1975 by Larrimore, et al. (2008). However, 
by construction, cell-means assume that all topcoded individuals have the same income. As a 
result, using cell-means to approximate top income shares with the public-use CPS data will lead 
to an overestimation of the income held by the 90th to 99th percentile groups and an 
underestimation of the income held by the top 1 percent of the distribution. 
3
 To ensure that model fit is maximized at the top of the distribution, the GB2 is fitted using 
observations in the richest 70 percent of the distribution only, with appropriate corrections for 
left truncation in the ML procedure. 
4
 In international comparisons of income inequality, it is most common to include the effect of 
both government transfer programs and tax policies by measuring post-tax, post-transfer income. 
See Atkinson and Brandolini (2001) and Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) for reviews of this 
literature. 
5
 In the wage inequality literature researchers tend to primarily be interested in how different 
types of workers – e.g. low vs. high skilled, women vs. men, etc. – are rewarded in the labor 
market. Hence in this literature it is common to measure pre-tax wage rates or labor earnings. 
Pre-tax pre-transfer market income is an extension of this concept to cover all factors of 
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production. Traditionally, researchers interested in income inequality have focused on how it 
relates to one’s ability to consume and hence include government transfers in the US literature 
and both taxes and transfers in the international comparative literature. In those literatures, pre-
tax pre-transfer income is rarely used by itself but rather to distinguish between incomes 
generated in the absence of government and a fuller measure of income which includes 
government taxes and transfers. In the CPS-based literature this has generally meant including 
cash transfers in income, thus using a pre-tax, post-transfer income definition for inequality 
estimation. Some researchers, including the National Research Council Panel on Poverty and 
Family Assistance, have advocated moving even farther from the pre-tax, pre-transfer market 
income definition when analyzing poverty by including taxes and non-cash transfers in US 
income inequality calculations. For a further discussion of the effect of such proposals on 
poverty rates and income inequality, see Burtless and Smeeding (2002). 
6
 In the small number of cases where never-married individuals under age 20 live in a household 
without a parent or guardian, we assigned them to the tax-unit of the primary family in the 
household or the oldest adult in the household when there is no primary family. Only if there are 
no adults over the age of 20 in the household are they considered their own tax-unit. Different 
procedures for classifying these individuals were tested, including removing them from the 
sample, and assigning them their own tax units, which produced substantively similar results. 
7
 While we provide the income source analysis for the top 1 percent in Appendix B, along with 
that for the lower income groups, we strongly caution against overanalyzing the results for this 
group because changes in censoring thresholds over time dramatically alter the makeup of 
income for this group which is not corrected for censoring using the GB2-based multiple 
imputation procedure. 
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8
 In the appendix of Piketty and Saez (2003), the series including capital gains illustrates a 
decline in the top 1 percent income share from 1986–1988 rather than the large increase shown 
for the top 1 percent income share when including capital gains. This suggests that the blip 
observed in the IRS data excluding capital gains in these years is partially attributable to income 
shifting to minimize tax liabilities. However, since capital gains income increased for top earners 
in the 1990s, when including capital gains there are greater increases in the top 1 percent income 
share in the IRS data in the 1990s (Piketty and Saez, 2003). These would likely exist in the CPS 
data as well if capital gains were captured there.   
9
 In both cases, it is assumed that the change in top 1% income shares from the other unaffected 
dataset captures the actual change in top income share over the blip year. So, for 1986–1988, the 
change in the blip-adjusted IRS series is assumed to equal the 4.1 percent increase in the top 1 
percent share seen in the CPS data and, for 1992–1993, the change in the blip-adjusted CPS 
series is assumed to equal the 4.9 percent decline in the top 1 percent share seen in the IRS data. 
The blip-adjustments also have a limited effect on the p90-p95 and p95-p99 income shares as the 
share assigned to the top 1 percent shifts. Figures illustrating the blip-adjusted income shares for 
these series are available upon request from the authors. 
10
 See Larrimore et al. (2008) for detailed information about the prevalence of censoring in the 
internal CPS data year by year. 
11
 For 1992–1993, since no Gini index is available in the IRS data when approximating the 
amount of the inequality increase that is real and the amount attributable to the redesign, it is 
assumed that the actual Gini increase matches the increase seen for the top 10% income share. 
This one-year assumption is only relevant for the average change over the entire 40 year period 
and the choice of this, or another reasonable assumption, should not greatly impact those results. 
